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LIVING WITH/OUT PROXIMITY: COMPARING A CONTESTED CONCEPT IN TORT 
Carl F Stychin, City University London and Clemens Rieder, Lancaster University 
 
INTRODUCTION 
We approach this article through shared insights gained from the experience of teaching 
Tort Law together at the University of Reading in England. One of us is a common law lawyer 
whose perspective was shaped by studying in Canada. As a subject which has evolved in 
very different ways across the common law world (and the definition of which is further 
complicated by the presence of Quebec civil law), comparison within the common law is 
itself often important and intellectually challenging, particularly for tort lawyers. The other 
comes to the subject as a civilian lawyer trained in Austria but who defines himself first and 
foƌeŵost as a ͚EuƌopeaŶ͛. It ǁas this Đoŵpleǆ iŶtelleĐtual aŶd politiĐal oƌieŶtatioŶ that he 
brought to a common law subject that he was teaching (and learning) for the first time. This 
set of ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes, ǁe ďelieǀe, pƌoǀided us ǁith a ͚laďoƌatoƌǇ͛ iŶ ǁhiĐh to eŶgage iŶ, aŶd 
reflect upon, comparison, mixture, and the possibility of hybridity in an understanding of 
the sources, methods and approaches which we take to legal knowledge. It gave us the 
opportunity to experiment on a micro level with the broad questions with which 
Đoŵpaƌatiǀe laǁǇeƌs eŶgage, aŶd to eǆploƌe the ŵeaŶiŶg of a ͚ŵiǆed juƌisdiĐtioŶ͛ iŶ its 
broadest formulation.  
Nowhere were the challenges of this dialogue more pronounced than when we 
taught the ͚dutǇ of Đaƌe͛ ƋuestioŶ iŶ the laǁ of ŶegligeŶĐe. It ǁas heƌe that, ŵoƌe thaŶ 
elsewhere, we found ourselves speaking in what appeared to be different legal languages 
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that we initially found difficult to translate. But that very fact sparked our interest in how we 
might understand the challenges of comparative law, legal harmonization in the European 
Union and, indeed, the definition of a mixed jurisdiction. Our experiment has led us to a 
more nuanced view of legal cultures and systems than we had before, in which we find 
ourselves eschewing legal cultural purity and the rigid categorization of legal systems. Here 
we subscribe to a view of culture and identity derived from cultural studies, which 
understands all culture as inevitably hybrid, dynamic, and a product of interaction which 
inevitably shapes the identity of all parties to the exchange.1 These same understandings 
increasingly have come to inform comparative law and the study of mixed jurisdictions. 
Legal culture – like culture more generally -- needs to be understood, not in terms of pure 
eŶtities that ĐaŶ ďe Đoŵpaƌed aŶd ĐoŶtƌasted, ďut ƌatheƌ thƌough ͚legal tƌaditioŶs͛ iŶteƌŶal 
ĐoŵpleǆitǇ͛.2 Thus, in this article, we explore how each of us came to appreciate the 
ĐoŵpleǆitǇ of ouƌ ͚oǁŶ͛ legal sǇsteŵ ;ǁhile ƌeĐogŶiziŶg that ǁe aƌe uŶeasǇ aŶsǁeƌiŶg 
questions about place and belonging). We attempt to uncover what now seem to us to be 
complexities within systems which reproduce what are usually described as the differences 
ďetǁeeŶ theŵ. We illustƌate this Đlaiŵ ǁith aŶ aŶalǇsis of the doĐtƌiŶe of ͚pƌoǆiŵitǇ͛ iŶ the 
common law of negligence and we draw comparisons to a civil law understanding of the 
issue. Through an analysis of what has proven to be an arduous journey through the 
common law – which has led to a wide diversity of approaches across common law 
                                                          
1 
 For an introduction to what is a vast literature, see P GILROY, THE BLACK ATLANTIC: MODERNITY AND 
DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS (1993); H BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE (1994); R JC YOUNG, COLONIAL 
DESIRE: HYBRIDITY IN THEORY, CULTURE AND RACE (1995). 
2 
 R Leckey, Cohabitation and Comparative Method, 72 MODERN LAW REVIEW 48, 49 (2009). 
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jurisdictions – ǁe eǆploƌe hoǁ pƌoǆiŵitǇ ďelies the Đlaiŵ to a uŶifoƌŵ oƌ ͚Ŷatuƌal͛ ĐoŵŵoŶ 
law mode of reasoning. We then hold a mirror up to the messiness of this tort doctrine by 
illustrating the complexities which can be found within civil law attempts to achieve 
analogous functional limitations on liability. In this, we employ the Austrian jurisdiction as a 
useful example of this theory. Finally, we attempt to use the lessons learned from this 
investigation in order to provide some tentative answers to wider questions concerning the 
value of comparison, the utility of the concept of a mixed jurisdiction, and the potential for  
European harmonization of tort law.3 
 
PROXIMITY AS MULTIPLICITY IN THE COMMON LAW 
We begin with the centrality of the duty of care concept in the common law tort of 
negligence. In fact, the historical development of the duty of care is frequently deployed as 
a pedagogic tool to explain how tort law (as emblematic of the common law itself) has 
developed from a series of disconnected legal duties into a general duty of care on which a 
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 It seeŵs appƌopƌiate that this aƌtiĐle ďegaŶ life foƌ a ĐoŶfeƌeŶĐe deǀoted to ͚FilliŶg the Gaps͛. The 
idea of legal gaps in itself is emblematic of how a gulf appears between civil law and common law reasoning. 
As Pƌofessoƌ ChiassoŶi eǆplaiŶs, foƌ ĐiǀiliaŶs, the gap ŵaǇ ďe a theoƌetiĐallǇ uŶpƌoďleŵatiĐ ͚ŵeƌe possibility for 
eǀeƌǇ giǀeŶ legal oƌdeƌ, oƌ aŶǇ seĐtioŶ theƌeof͛ ;p ϱϰͿ. Foƌ ĐoŵŵoŶ laǁ theoƌists, ďǇ ĐoŶtƌast, the gap ƌaises 
fuŶdaŵeŶtal ĐoŶĐeptual ͚iŶteƌ-related issues concerning judicial discretion, the existence of right answers to 
legal pƌoďleŵs, aŶd laǁ͛s deteƌŵiŶaĐǇ ;oƌ iŶdeteƌŵiŶaĐǇͿ. ... the ǀeƌǇ Ŷatuƌe aŶd guidiŶg poǁeƌs of legal ƌules͛ 
(p 74): P Chiassoni, A Tale from Two Traditions: Civil Law, Common Law, and Legal Gaps, 2006 ANALISI E 
DIRITTO 51 (2006), available at 
<www.giuri.unige.it/intro/dipist/digita/filo/testi/analisi_2007/03chiassoni.pdf>.  
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principled tort law was grafted. This story is highlighted by the momentous attempt to 
articulate a general test for the duty of care through the concepts of foreseeability and 
neighbourhood.4 In this way, it is made immediately clear that the duty has built within it 
the control mechanism by which liability is inevitably limited, in that it is a duty owed to 
oŶe͛s Ŷeighďouƌ ƌatheƌ thaŶ to the ǁoƌld at laƌge. Foƌ the puƌist of the ĐoŵŵoŶ laǁ, this is a 
necessarily principled limitation which constrains and shapes the general duty of care no 
matter the novelty of the category or scenario that may arise. As students of English 
common law tort are taught from day one, the duty is grounded in the relationship between 
ĐlaiŵaŶt aŶd defeŶdaŶt. That is, the ͚ƌelatioŶal Ŷatuƌe of the peƌsoŶal oďligatioŶ͛ liŵits to 
whom the duty of care is necessarily owed.5 
But while the duty of care is constitutively a limited one in that sense, the genius of 
Loƌd AtkiŶ͛s judgŵeŶt iŶ Donoghue v Stevenson was its breadth and generality – that 
potentially it could apply to any category of case. In short, it was a general duty of care, and 
the iŵpliĐatioŶs of his judgŵeŶt to soŵe eǆteŶt ǁeƌe iŵpliĐit iŶ Loƌd AtkiŶ͛s ǁoƌds. IŶ this 
moment, the formulation of a general duty replaces the fragmented set of specific non-
contractual duties that had evolved through the history of the common law. In making this 
shift, the House of Lords started from a principle of generality familiar to the civil law 
tradition. Indeed, the common law textbook tradition, which began in the nineteenth 
century, was itself an attempt to categorize (into subjects) and to generalize (from 
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 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL). 
5 
 S Van Praagh, Palsgƌaf as ͞TƌaŶssysteŵic͟ Toƌt Laǁ, 6 JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 243, 250 
(2012). 
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principles) using the masses of case law that had grown up through the history of the 
common law.6 This is an important element of the peculiar history of English legal education 
and the emerging role of law within the university and was guided by the new common law 
pƌofessoƌ. It ǁas the aĐadeŵiĐs͛ Đlaiŵs ƌegaƌdiŶg the sĐieŶtifiĐ studǇ of laǁ ;ǁhiĐh ǁas 
indebted to the principles of scientific classification that so dominated the period) that 
justified the place of law in the university and which established the law professor as the 
classifier and organizer of doctrine into a set of general statements of principle that could be 
applied (even if in a formalistic fashion). That process did not occur in a historical vacuum. 
Not only were the methods of other academic disciplines influential, but the civil law 
tradition was inevitably influencing this incredibly important professional group seeking to 
establish its identity and role in society.7 
The supreme irony, of course, is that Donoghue v Stevenson is a case from Scotland, 
a ŵiǆed juƌisdiĐtioŶ ǁhiĐh ͚has dƌaǁŶ fƌoŵ the Điǀil laǁ ǁoƌld oǀeƌ tiŵe to a sigŶifiĐaŶt aŶd 
telliŶg degƌee͛.8 Given that the same Law Lords heard appeals from both jurisdictions, it is 
haƌdlǇ suƌpƌisiŶg that deǀelopŵeŶts iŶ eaĐh legal sǇsteŵ iŶflueŶĐed the otheƌ, although ͚the 
                                                          
6 
 See D Sugarman, Legal Theory, the Common Law Mind, and the Making of the Textbook Tradition, in 
LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW 26 (W Twining ed., 1986). 
7 
 See generally A W B Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 91 LAW QUARTERLY 
REVIEW 247 (1975). 
8 
 D L Carey Miller and M M Combe, The Boundaries of Property Rights in Scots Law, 10.3 ELECTRONIC 
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1 (2006), available at <ǁǁǁ.ejĐl.oƌg     aƌt   -ϰ.pdf .  
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tǁo sǇsteŵs aƌe ďuilt oŶ eŶtiƌelǇ diffeƌeŶt fouŶdatioŶs͛.9 Students, academics and 
practitioners throughout the common law world rarely note, however, that Donoghue v 
Stevenson is ͚peƌhaps the ŵost faŵous eǆaŵple of EŶglish laǁ tƌeatiŶg a “Đottish pƌiǀate 
laǁ Đase as legal authoƌitǇ͛,10 illustrating vividly the impact of a mixed jurisdiction on the 
development of the common law. 
The simplicity of the duty of care formula belies the actual complexity and diversity 
within the historical development of the common law of tort, which was never 
straightforward. Within English common law, the tensions were made obvious  by the 
apparently broad rearticulation of the test as a presumption of duty for all foreseeable 
injury, subject to any contrary policy concerns that might negate it, leaving unclear whether 
the foreseeability stage necessarily contained within in some additional control device on 
liability.11 This was followed by the famous judicial retreat towards the incremental 
development of the categories of negligence liability and the current three stage Caparo 
test which reclaims the language of proximity as a control device on factual foreseeability.12 
This is combined with the residual categorical requirement by which policy concerns 
potentially can negate liability for harm that is otherwise foreseeable and proximate. All of 
these inquiries are contained within the contours of the duty inquiry. 
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 Ibid., 2. 
10 
 Ibid., fn 7. 
11 
 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728 (HL). 
12 
 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL). 
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For our purposes, of particular interest is the role of proximity in this analysis, which 
continues to cause judicial and academic consternation in terms of whether it possesses 
some independent meaning as a test against which facts in a novel case can be measured.13 
This has led to vociferous academic debate within tort law scholarship between corrective 
justiĐe ͚puƌists͛ aŶd those ǁho uŶdeƌstaŶd toƌt laǁ iŶ ŵoƌe ͚legal ƌealist͛ teƌŵs.14 That 
battle centers on how we should explain proximity as a control device limiting the scope of 
liability. By definition, corrective justice theorists are skeptical of the appropriateness and 
usefulness of policy based arguments to control tort liability, which they argue is an 
inappropriate intrusion by distributive justice principles. For corrective justice advocates, 
proximity can achieve a degree of certainty and principle in shaping the duty analysis, 
provided that it remains focused on the bipolar relationship between the parties and avoids 
aŶ opeŶ eŶded ͚legal iŶtuitioŶisŵ͛ ǁhiĐh leads to uŶpƌedictability of outcome.15 
Furthermore, they claim that the failure of courts to structure their reasoning in terms of 
the ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ the paƌties giǀiŶg ƌise to a dutǇ has led to a ͚disiŶtegƌatioŶ͛ of the 
law of negligence into a series of duties without the analytical tools to reason across 
                                                          
13 
 See eg R Kidner, Resiling from the Anns Principle: The Variable Nature of Proximity in Negligence, 7 
LEGAL STUDIES 319 (1987). 
14 
 For two starkly opposing positions, see eg A Beever, Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in 
Tort Law, 28 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 475 (2008) and J Stapleton, The Golden Thread at the Heart 
of Tort Law, 24 AUSTRALIAN BAR REVIEW 135 (2003-2004).  
15 
 A Beever, Particularism and Prejudice in the Law of Tort, 11 TORT LAW REVIEW 146, 147 (2003). 
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different types of case.16 In this way, the common law has reverted back to a series of 
different duties with little analytically holding the mosaic together.  
BǇ ĐoŶtƌast, those ǁith a ŵoƌe ͚legal ƌealist͛ oƌientation are deeply skeptical of this 
divorcing of principle and policy and they argue that corrective justice theorists have 
overstated their concerns. Rather than ad hoc decision making, we have reached an historic 
ŵoŵeŶt iŶ ǁhiĐh ǁe haǀe a seƌies of ͚poĐkets͛ of liaďilitǇ ;suĐh as the Đategoƌies of 
economic loss) based upon specific factors of both principle and policy which drive the 
determination in each type of case.17 The outcomes therefore are relatively predictable. As 
long as the reasoning within each pocket of liability is coherent, consistent, predictable and 
open, there is little reason for concern as to how we get to that point. The claim that 
proximity is a meaningful definitional element of the duty question is at best a fiction and at 
worst a source of confusion that muddies a functional analysis.18 
We would argue, however, that what has become a vociferous debate can be 
examined through the lens of comparative law. We are indebted here to Professor Van 
Pƌaagh͛s Đlaiŵ that ͚as the pƌofessoƌs iŶ a transsystemic classroom keep insisting, the line 
between civil and common law is not as clear as we might be tempted to think or as we 
                                                          
16 
 E Weinrib, The Disintegration of Duty,    ADVOCATE“͛ QUA‘TE‘LY 2 2 ;2  ϲͿ. 
17 
 J Stapleton, Duty of Care Factors: A Selection from the Judicial Menu, in THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 59 
(P Cane and J Stapleton, eds., 1998).  
18 
 J F Keeler, The Proximity of Past and Future: Australian and British Approaches to Analysing the Duty 
of Care, 12 ADELAIDE LAW REVIEW 93, 101 (1989). 
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ŵight ǁaŶt.͛19 Van Praagh uses the famous American case of Palsgraf20 to demonstrate her 
point, arguing that the contrasting approaches of Justice Cardozo and Justice Andrews 
provide a microcosm of two distinct analytical approaches (within a common law judgment) 
which parallel the contrasting ways in which the civil and common law place limitations on 
the defeŶdaŶt͛s liaďility to the claimant for extra-contractual losses. Justice Cardozo focuses 
oŶ ͚the ƌelatioŶal Ŷatuƌe of the peƌsoŶal oďligatioŶ iŶ the toƌt of ŶegligeŶĐe͛,21 a position to 
which the corrective justice theorists are intellectually wedded. For Justice Andrews, the 
very fact that the claimant was injured means that a relationship is formed and the question 
is whether the cause is proximate. That determination is necessarily inexact and proximity 
Đeases to eǆist at soŵe poiŶt: ͚ďeĐause of ĐoŶǀeŶieŶĐe, of puďliĐ policy, of a rough sense of 
justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is 
Ŷot logiĐ. It is pƌaĐtiĐal politiĐs͛.22 This statement precisely exemplifies what corrective 
justice theorists rail against. But for legal realists, it provides a refreshing openness to the 
realities of judicial decision making (and, not surprisingly, it was written in an era in which 
legal ƌealisŵ as a ŵoǀeŵeŶt ǁas at its high ǁateƌ ŵaƌkͿ. Foƌ ǀaŶ Pƌaagh, JustiĐe AŶdƌeǁs͛ 
dissent represents the road not taken by the common law – an approach which uses an 
                                                          
19 
 Van Praagh, supra note __ at 247. 
20 
 Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co., 248 NY 339, 162 NE 99 (New York Court of Appeals). 
21 
 Van Praagh, supra note __ at 250. 
22 
 Ibid., 251. 
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open ended analysis based on causation as a control device on liability which closely 
replicates the structure of the Civil Code of Quebec (the comparator in her analysis).23  
Furthermore, the disagreements around the formulation of the duty of care inquiry 
are evident in the diverse ways in which the common law has developed worldwide. 
Perhaps in no other area have we seen appeal courts advance by way of different forks in 
the common law road, particularly in light of the retreat from Anns by the House of Lords.24 
This led the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council itself to acknowledge that, at least with 
respect to some aspects of the duty of care, there is not one common law, but a range of 
valid common law approaches.25 For example, despite the decision of the House of Lords to 
repudiate the Anns approach, the Supreme Court of Canada has remained generally wedded 
to its formula. In Cooper v Hobart, the Court replicated the two stages of Anns, although 
greater guidance was provided into the reasoning process to be undertaken by courts.26 In a 
jointly authored judgment, Justice McLachlin and Justice Major made clear that the first 
stage demands consideration, not only of reasonable foreseeability as a matter of fact, but 
also whether the relationship satisfies a legal requirement of sufficient closeness which they 
describe as proximity.27 Interestingly, however, the judgment also recognizes the role of 
                                                          
23 
 Ibid. 
24 
 See C F Stychin, The Vulnerable Subject of Negligence Law, 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW IN 
CONTEXT 337 (2012). 
25 
 Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1996] 1 All ER 756 (PC). 
26 
 Cooper v Hobart [2001] SCC 79. 
27 
 Ibid., para 30. 
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those policy factors which are tied to the relationship between the parties at that first stage 
aŶalǇsis. The seĐoŶd stage ĐoŶsists of those poliĐǇ faĐtoƌs ǁhiĐh lie ͚outside the ƌelatioŶship 
of the paƌties that ŵaǇ Ŷegatiǀe the iŵpositioŶ of a dutǇ of Đaƌe͛.28 On the facts, the 
defendant – a public body charged with the regulation of financial services – was found to 
owe no duty to an investor at stage one, based on the absence of a sufficiently close 
relationship between the parties. For critics of the judgment, its reasoning opens the door 
to open ended, ad hoc, poliĐǇ dƌiǀeŶ aŶalǇsis, ǁhiĐh has ďeeŶ desĐƌiďed as a ͚ƌaŵshaĐkle 
eŶƋuiƌǇ͛29 aŶd a ͚stuff saĐk͛30 which holds a plethora of otherwise unconnected factors to be 
judicially called upon in order to achieve some rough sense of justice.  Although the Court 
does not explicitly turn to a comparative law analysis in Cooper v Hobart, the development 
of Canadian tort law – particularly in the landmark economic loss cases – demonstrates an 
openness to comparative civil law analysis and it is perhaps no surprise that the Court has 
departed from the rigidity of English doctrine on the existence of a duty of care.  
 Even further extreme in the judicial deconstruction of the proximity requirement is 
the current approach of the High Court of Australia, which ultimately rejected proximity as a 
ĐoŶĐeptual tool iŶ faǀoƌ of the ͚salieŶt featuƌes͛ appƌoaĐh, iŶ ƌeĐogŶitioŶ of the faĐt that 
͚diffeƌeŶt Đlasses of Đase giǀe ƌise to diffeƌeŶt pƌoďleŵs iŶ deteƌŵiŶiŶg the eǆisteŶĐe aŶd 
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 Ibid. 
29 
 Weinrib, supra note __ at 238. 
30 
 M P Gergen, The Ambit of Negligence Liability for Pure Economic Loss, 48 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW 749, 
749 (2006). 
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nature or scope, of a dutǇ of Đaƌe͛.31 Salient features are simply those factors which the 
courts are to weigh and balance in determining whether there is sufficiently compelling 
reason to attach legal liability to a situation of harm. That list of factors includes both those 
centering upon the relationship between the parties as well as on broader distributive 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶs. The appƌoaĐh ĐaŶ ďe uŶdeƌstood as a ͚dƌilliŶg doǁŶ͛ iŶto the ĐoŶĐept of pƌoǆiŵitǇ 
iŶ oƌdeƌ to pƌoǀide guidaŶĐe foƌ futuƌe Đouƌts: ͚to iŶfuse ŵeaŶiŶg aŶd pƌoǀide a set of 
pƌaĐtiĐal aŶalǇtiĐal faĐtoƌs͛.32 In sum, our argument is that with proximity we see judicial 
methodological choices being made which, to varying degrees, subvert the common law 
claim to focus upon the bipolar relationship as a basis for the imposition of liability.33 In the 
process, we move instead towards more open ended, policy informed analysis in which 
allegiance to the language of duty increasingly becomes formal and ex post facto. The 
current Australian focus on salient features – particularly in the way in which it is being 
applied by lower courts – appears closer to the notion of proximate cause than it does to 
the rigidity of the corrective justice conception of the duty relationship founded purely on 
͚pƌiŶĐiple͛.34 It is an explicitly open ended search for whether there is sufficient connection 
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 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562 at 579. 
32 
 D Tan, The Salient Features of Proximity: Examining the Spandeck Formulation for Establishing a Duty 
of Care, 2010 SINGAPORE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 459, 466 (2010). 
33 
 The willingness of some members of the Supreme Court of England and Wales to explicitly consider 
distributive justice issues in tort law provides another, and probably the most stark example of this subversion. 
See eg Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455, per Lord Hoffman. 
34 
 See eg Caltex Refineries (Qld) Ptd Ltd v Stravar [2009] NSWCA 258. 
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between the parties and could as easily be framed in terms of causation rather than duty. 
For corrective justice purists, this is a complete subversion of their belief that common law 
liability in negligence should be founded solely on the principled relationship between two 
parties.  
Proximity provides, we argue, a useful lesson which should caution us against 
generalized claims about common law reasoning. The case of Donoghue v Stevenson – 
which has achieved such folklore status in the story of the common law – is significant 
pƌeĐiselǇ ďeĐause of Loƌd AtkiŶ͛s atteŵpt at ĐƌeatiŶg a geŶeƌalized ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of dutǇ fƌoŵ 
the particular duties which had grown up over time. That attempt at generality can be 
understood, not as the logical outcome of common law development, but as the replication 
of a civilian tradition (one which we believe he would have been very familiar). The control 
deǀiĐe oŶ liaďilitǇ of ͚the Ŷeighďouƌ͛ – proximity – is seen as a uniquely common law 
mechanism to constrain liability from the outset of the analysis by focusing on the factors 
connecting two parties in order to establish duty. However, the way in which proximity has 
proven to be such an intractable problem for common law courts has led to a fragmentation 
of common law approaches and we increasingly see an open ended factorial analysis 
determining the outcome. That approach in some guises comes to resemble the use of 
proximate cause as a control device which mixes principle and policy and which may prove 
to be increasingly open to fact specific determinations. In this moment, the common law 
duty question appears to be deconstructed. As tort lawyers, we find ourselves left with a 
loss of ouƌ ĐeƌtaiŶties ƌegaƌdiŶg aŶǇ seŶse of the ͚puƌitǇ͛ of ĐoŵŵoŶ laǁ Đultuƌe, ǁhiĐh 
seems to have an identity best characterized, not in terms of purity, but in the language of 
tensions, complexity, hybridity and even mixture. In exploring this contested meaning to 
14 
 
proximity, it is hardly surprising that one of us asked the other the question that common 
laǁ laǁǇeƌs aƌe so foŶd of askiŶg of theiƌ ĐiǀiliaŶ ĐouŶteƌpaƌts: ͚so hoǁ does the Điǀil laǁ 
deal ǁith the pƌoďleŵ?͛ It is to the diffiĐult task of tƌǇiŶg to aŶsǁeƌ that ƋuestioŶ that ǁe 
now turn.  
 
PROXIMITY IN THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM – AN UNACKNOWLEDGED CONCEPT 
In this section, we expand upon the answer which one of us gave to that question and we 
underscore the challenge which he experienced in trying to make sense of proximity from a 
civilian perspective (and the point of comparison for our purposes is the Austrian civil law). 
However, as with the attempt to understand one system through comparison with the 
other, we again found ourselves – as with the common law -- uncovering the complexity and 
͚otheƌŶess͛ within civil law concepts themselves. Not surprisingly, here the starting point is 
the ƌeleǀaŶt pƌoǀisioŶ of the AustƌiaŶ Ciǀil Code, ǁhiĐh ƌeads: ͚Everybody is entitled to 
demand indemnification for damage for a person causing injury by his fault; the damage 
may have been caused either by the violation of a contract or without regards to a 
ĐoŶtƌaĐt͛.35 On its face, the norm clearly suggests that the answer to the question of who 
ĐaŶ ďe held liaďle is siŵplǇ ͚aŶǇ peƌsoŶ͛. IŶ this ƌespeĐt at least, the Austƌian approach is 
eŵďleŵatiĐ of a ĐiǀiliaŶ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg, ďǇ ǁhiĐh ͚[a] dutǇ eǆpƌessed iŶ suĐh geŶeƌal oƌ 
uŶiǀeƌsal teƌŵs is ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐ of a Điǀil laǁ appƌoaĐh.͛36 But, as we will argue, the 
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 § 1295 Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (ABGB; Austrian Civil Code), translation ours. 
36 
 Van Praagh, supra note __ at 248. 
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apparent simplicity of this answer, on closer examination, is undermined by the appearance 
of tensions and complexity. 
To return to the question with which we found ourselves grappling as teachers, we 
can ask what devices do civil law systems have at their disposal in order to limit or control 
the scope of liability in order to constrain the reach of liability? The standard answer which 
common law lawyers with an interest in the civil law are likely to provide is that civil law 
systems use causation in order to limit what are otherwise potentially overbroad liabilities.37 
To repeat the point we made earlier, this is the tradition which Van Praagh argues that 
Justice Andrews in Palsgraf mimics. Justice Andrews holds that the judge must examine:  
[W]hether there was a natural and continuous sequence between cause and effect. 
Was the one a substantial factor in producing the other? Was there a direct 
connection between them, without too many intervening causes? Is the effect of 
cause on result not too attenuated? Is the cause likely, in the usual judgment of 
mankind, to produce the result? Or, by the exercise of prudent foresight, could the 
result be foreseen? Is the result too remote from the cause, and here we consider 
remoteness in time and space.38  
 
Our claim is that, as with the development of the common law, the simplicity of this 
formulation can be deceptive as new concepts have evolved over time, and the result 
becomes instead a mixture of processes of legal reasoning.  
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For example, the Austrian approach reveals that, rather than the straightforward use 
of causation applied on a fact specific basis to control liability, the determination of liability 
includes moments in which closer parallels can be drawn to common law methodology. We 
illustrate this claim by exploring three categories of case. The first perhaps best illustrates 
the ĐoŵŵoŶ laǁ laǁǇeƌ͛s steƌeotǇpe of ĐiǀiliaŶ ƌeasoŶiŶg. This ƌule foĐuses upoŶ ͚the 
pƌoteĐtiǀe puƌpose of the Ŷoƌŵ͛ ;Rechtwidrigkeitszusammenhang), by which legal 
responsibility is established without making reference to the relationship between claimant 
and defendant at all. From the perspective of the common law lawyer, this category appears 
to ďe the ŵost ͚otheƌ͛ ďeĐause it does Ŷot ƌelǇ upoŶ the ƌelatioŶship to gƌouŶd liaďilitǇ 
specifically, or lack of proximity to conclude that no legal relationship exists. Nor does it 
need a device to control the frontier of liability since it does not rest upon the idea of duty 
at all. But, in addition, within Austrian law there are two further categories which, we argue, 
have parallels to the role of proximity in tort. The two categories share reliance upon the 
fiction of contractual relationship which proves to be legally advantageous for the claimant 
when the relationship is in fact non-contractual. The first category is the doctrine of culpa in 
contrahendo aŶd the seĐoŶd is ďest desĐƌiďed as ͚ĐoŶtƌaĐt ǁith pƌoteĐtiǀe effeĐt foƌ thiƌd 
paƌties͛. It is to these ƌatheƌ ŵoƌe ĐoŵpliĐated eleŵeŶts of the stoƌǇ of liaďilitǇ ǁithiŶ the 
civil law that we now turn. 
 
͚The Protective Purpose of the Norm͛ (Rechtwidrigkeitszusammenhang) 
We ďegiŶ theŶ ǁith the doĐtƌiŶe of ͚the pƌoteĐtiǀe puƌpose of the Ŷoƌŵ͛, ǁhiĐh itself defies 
the claim that it is causation that provides the only control device on liability in at least this 
civilian context. Rather, the protective purpose of the norm limits liability in a distinctive 
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fashion, which serves to underscore the pluralism and diversity within the civil law which 
should not be erased. The decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in Brisson v Potvin39 can 
be used to illuminate the point. In this case, a driver parked his truck upon the sidewalk. As 
a consequence, a child ran into the street in order to avoid the truck and was hit by an 
oncoming car. Intuitively, it appears that causation is easily established, but the Court found 
no liability on the part of the driver of the truck because there were too many intervening 
events and therefore cause adequate was not present.   
Within Austrian law, by contrast, a rather different means of controlling liability 
would be utilized. Rather than turning to proximate cause, the issue is simply and 
exclusively an interpretation of the norm. To reiterate, the relevant section of the Austrian 
Ciǀil Code states that the ĐlaiŵaŶt ŵaǇ ďe ĐoŵpeŶsated foƌ daŵage ͚Đaused eitheƌ ďǇ the 
violation of a contract or without regards to a contract͛ ǁhiĐh suggests that the ĐeŶtƌal liŵit 
on liability remains causation. But the Austrian courts developed an alternative mechanism 
to ĐoŶtƌol liaďilitǇ aŶd it is heƌe that the ĐoŶĐept of the ͚pƌoteĐtiǀe puƌpose of the Ŷoƌŵ͛ 
plays a crucial role. At the turn of the previous century, it was still very exceptional for 
Austrian courts to make reference to this concept. However, this dramatically changed and 
the courts began to increasingly rely upon it, leading to its extensive development through 
academic writing, reaching its peak in the 1960s.40 Without the existence of the doctrine, it 
would have been necessary, as the Quebec Court of Appeal had done, to show damage, 
causation and fault. Logically, liability could be limited only by showing that one of those 
                                                          
39 
 Brisson v Potvin [1948] Quebec KB 38. 
40 
 Welser, supra note __ at 1. 
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requirements was not met, thereby forcing a court into what can be a difficult and 
contested analysis of causation.41 The doctrine of the protective purpose of the norm 
changes that dynamic. 
This shift can be illustrated by reference to decisions of the Highest Austrian Civil 
Court. In one case, guidance was given on how to determine the protective purpose of a 
norm. According to the Court, the protective purpose of a norm can be found from its 
ĐoŶteŶt ;͚Der Schutzzweck der Norm ergibt sich aus ihrem Inhalt͚Ϳ, ǁhiĐh iŶ itself is ƌatheƌ 
unhelpful (and circular) reasoning.42 But as every first year law student knows, it is 
necessary to apply the rules of statutory interpretation in order to determine the meaning 
of legislation. Thus, the Court suggests – and, of course, the Court reinforces every common 
laǁ laǁǇeƌ͛s steƌeotǇpe aďout statutoƌǇ iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ ǁithiŶ the civilian system in doing so 
-- that the protective purpose of the norm can be established through a teleological 
interpretation (͚Das Geƌicht hat das aŶzuǁeŶdeŶde “chutzgesetz teleologisch zu 
interpretieren͚Ϳ.43 It is here that we find the control device on liability in that it requires 
ĐoŶgƌueŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ the speĐifiĐ foƌŵ of haƌŵ suffeƌed aŶd the laǁ͛s puƌpose. 
Once again, the point might best be illustrated through an example. According to the 
Austrian Road Traffic Law, the speed limit for cars within built up areas is fifty km/h. What 
happens if a person drives at seventy km/h within a built up area and is subsequently 
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 Ibid.; see also R LANG, NORMZWECK UND DUTY OF CARE 14-15 (1983). 
42 
 OGH, 8 Ob 133/78. 
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involved in an accident on the same journey but not within the built up area? We could 
frame the issue in terms of causation. The argument in favor of liability would be that if the 
defendant had driven within the legal speed limit within the built up area then he would 
have arrived later at the spot where the accident eventually happened and no accident 
would have occurred. If one relies exclusively upon what the Austrian lawyer calls 
͚ÄƋuiǀaleŶzlehƌe͛ ;͚ĐoŶditio siŶe Ƌua ŶoŶ͛Ϳ oƌ the EŶglish laǁǇeƌ the ͚ďut foƌ test͛, this ǁould 
lead to a counterintuitive result. Therefore, as in the common law, the Austrian lawyer 
would apply further instruments to limit causation. The common law lawyer would make 
reference to fault, whereas the Austrian lawyer within causation would invoke the 
͚Adäquanzprinzip͛ ;pƌiŶĐiple of adeƋuaĐǇͿ. The ĐoŶĐept should eliŵiŶate ƌatheƌ atǇpiĐal 
chains of causation (such as the egg-shell skull). Needless to saǇ, this ͚seĐoŶd leg͛ of AustƌiaŶ 
causation does not really help to limit causation in our case because it is not out of the 
ordinary that accidents happen when one drives a car.  
In this context, the concept of the protective purpose of the norm may be a helpful 
control device, which is to be distinguished from the principle of adequacy.44 The protective 
purpose of the norm (subjective intention of the legislator45) conceptually does not belong 
to the test of causation (which is established through the objective bystander46) but there 
does ƌeŵaiŶ a liŶk: BǇdliŶksi ŵakes the poiŶt that oŶlǇ daŵages ǁhiĐh fulfill the ͚pƌiŶĐiple of 
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adeƋuaĐǇ͛ ǁill ďe tested to deteƌŵiŶe ǁhetheƌ the pƌoteĐtiǀe puƌpose of the Ŷoƌŵ is 
infringed.47 This means that the causation test is relatively unproblematic in Austria because 
the real control mechanism in this case is taking place on the next level of analysis. For our 
purposes, this would mean that in order to establish the protective purpose of the speed 
limit within the built up area, we would conclude that the purpose was to provide better 
protection for pedestrians and cyclists who naturally meet more often in these areas. 
Therefore, any accident that occurs as a consequence of speeding within a built up area 
would be clearly covered. But the purpose of the lower speed limit is clearly not to prevent 
accidents outside of the built up area, which suggests that no liability would attach in this 
case. 
The way in which the protective purpose of the norm limits liability can be illustrated 
through a second example. Due to heavy traffic through the Alps causing pollution, the 
legislature through statute allows for a reduction in the speed limit (from 130 km/h to 100 
km/h) whenever air quality reaches a critical level. Clearly the protective purpose of the 
norm is environmental rather than accident prevention. If a driver speeds and an accident 
occurs as a consequence, the fact that the person overstepped the speed limit should not 
lead to liability. After all, the speed limit was in place for environmental and not safety 
reasons. In a result which will seem very counterintuitive to a common law audience, there 
will be no liability.48  
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In sum, the protective purpose of the norm can provide an additional control device 
on liability, although we recognize that the hypothetical examples we have raised thus far 
concern the interpretation of secondary legislation which can lead to individual liability, 
rather than the interpretation of the Civil Code itself. Nevertheless, the significance of the 
doctrine can be illustrated by returning now to the judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal 
in Brisson v Potvin. For an Austrian court, the emphasis would be on the law which was 
overstepped and the determination of its protective purpose. While the Quebec Court of 
Appeal turned to causation as a control device, an Austrian court might well simply refer to 
the protective purpose of the traffic law that was violated.  We could make at least a 
credible argument that one reason why traffic laws prohibit parking on sidewalks is because 
parked vehicles can obstruct the view of drivers and pedestrians, and therefore liability on 
these facts would fall squarely within the purpose of the rule. Of course, if that is not the 
purpose, then the Austrian court would find itself in agreement with the Quebec Court of 
Appeal, but would have arrived there by a very different route.  
To this point, it appears that the concept of proximity has no analogue within the 
Austrian system because liability can be limited through quite a straightforward device of 
teleological interpretation in the form of the protective purpose of the norm doctrine. 
However, that appearance is deceptive because there remain two categories of cases in 
ǁhiĐh the ͚pƌoǆiŵitǇ to pƌoǆiŵitǇ͛ ďeĐoŵes ŵuĐh Ŷeaƌeƌ. What uŶites these Đategoƌies is 
that, despite the fact that there exists no contractual relationship between the parties, 
nevertheless a legal fiction of the existence of a contract is employed in order to enhance 
the ĐhaŶĐes of the ĐlaiŵaŶt͛s ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ.  
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Culpa in Contrahendo 
The category of culpa in contrahendo (cic) deals with the pre-contractual situation. The 
Austrian Civil Code makes no reference to this category. Rather, cic has been created 
through analogy49 by the courts and it has now become part of the customary law.50 Once 
cic is established, liability rules (based on contract) apply to the parties, which benefits the 
claimant (compared to the rules governing liability ex delicto). Our concern in this article is 
not the rules per se (which are complex), but the method of reasoning that the courts 
employ. In order to establish cic, the claimant need only be a potential contractual partner, 
such as the customer of a pub. In one case, a person entered a pub but fell and was injured 
because the path leading to the pub was still icy despite the fact that the owner had cleared 
the path of snow. In order for the defendant to be held liable in negligence, the Court 
pointed out that cic needed to be established. The Court held that the case turned on 
whether the claimant had the intention to enter the pub as a potential customer.51 
Central to the doctrine of cic is the relationship between the two parties and it is 
from the relationship that a duty arises. Some argue that the reason for cic having this 
function is that social contact requires trust and if this relationship of trust is violated then 
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this should have consequences.52 Understood in this way, cic is closely linked to the concept 
of vulnerability – ͚the ĐoŶŶeĐtedŶess from which an ethical responsibility to the other 
aƌises͛ -- which one of us has argued has a central role to play in common law tort.53 
Likewise, cic expresses a certain closeness and, in this regard, there are parallels to the 
function which proximity performs in the common law. Only if there is a sufficiently close 
relationship between the parties can liability based upon cic follow. Although it is a 
narrower doctrine than proximity -- applying only to the pre-contractual situation -- its 
emergence has further parallels to the way in which common law courts have grappled with 
the deǀelopŵeŶt of ĐoŶĐuƌƌeŶt liaďilitǇ iŶ toƌt aŶd ĐoŶtƌaĐt as ǁell as the ͚Ŷeaƌ to ĐoŶtƌaĐt͛ 
type claim in negligence.54 This should also seem familiar to common law lawyers in terms 
of the method of legal reasoning. The courts are developing legal doctrine and then using 
previous judgments as the basis for defining duties in subsequent cases. We would argue 
that it illustƌates Pƌofessoƌ Palŵeƌ͛s Đlaiŵ that theƌe eǆists ͚a kiŶd of double reasoning 
pƌoĐess͛ ǁithiŶ ĐiǀiliaŶ sǇsteŵs.55  
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Another example from the Austrian civil law concerned a claimant who slipped on a 
grape in a self-service shop and was injured. This again was found to amount to a cic 
relationship, although the highest Austrian Court in civil matters (OGH) ultimately rejected 
the defeŶdaŶt shop oǁŶeƌ͛s liaďilitǇ ďeĐause that ǁould go ďeǇoŶd ǁhat ĐaŶ ďe ƌeasoŶaďlǇ 
expected of him.56 Yet again we see the role of conceptual nearness between the parties 
establishing a relationship that potentially leads to liability. It is easier to identify than in the 
common law because here it refers to  spatial proximity from which functional proximity can 
ďe ƌeadilǇ assuŵed. Neǀeƌtheless, its eŵeƌgeŶĐe ǁithiŶ the Điǀil laǁ pƌoǀides a ͚tƌaĐe͛ of a 
form of analysis usually associated with common law reasoning. However, there remains 
one further piece of evidence to examine in relation to our thesis, and that is our last 
ĐategoƌǇ of Đases ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg ͚ĐoŶtƌaĐt ǁith pƌoteĐtiǀe effeĐt foƌ thiƌd paƌties.͛ 
 
Contract with Protective Effect for Third Parties  
The staƌtiŶg poiŶt foƌ ouƌ aŶalǇsis of this doĐtƌiŶe is agaiŶ the iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ ͚eǀeƌǇďodǇ͛ iŶ 
the Austrian Civil Code.57 In this scenario, the question is the extent to which a contractual 
relationship between two parties spills over in order to protect a third party who is not 
party to the contract. The position in the Austrian civil law is that the third party will be 
provided with the same level of protection as would be available if she was a party to the 
contract and in excess of what would otherwise be available in tort. 
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A classic example, not too different from Donoghue v Stevenson in principle, would 
be the following 1934 Austrian case:58  a person bought a bicycle in a shop but was then 
injured because the bike was faulty. He sued the manufacturer and not the retailer and the 
issue was whether he could be compensated for his injuries. One way to establish the 
liability of the manufacturer with regard to the third party, the buyer, would be through 
liability ex delicto. However, the problem is that, as previously argued, it is necessary to 
show that the harm was part of the protective purpose of the norm; no neighbour principle 
is at play here. The difficulty is twofold: first, the burden of proof is on the buyer, and 
second, the courts generally apply a rather strict interpretation in order to avoid limitless 
liability which could endanger business.59 However, the alternative approach is to construct 
the contract between the manufacturer and retailer as a contract with protective effect for 
the consumer. The obvious advantage is to reverse the burden of proof.60 But the problem 
remains as to how to avoid limitless liability in the absence of the neighbour principle. The 
solution which Austrian law has devised is to require answers to two inquiries. First, a third 
party is protected when the two contracting parties could foresee the contact of a third 
party within the contractual duty. In our case, if a retailer buys a bike it is certainly 
foreseeable that a third party will buy the bike eventually. After all, the retailer would not 
purchase the bike if it did not hope to eventually sell it to the third party. The same, one can 
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argue, applies in Donoghue v Stevenson: the ginger beer is sold by the manufacturer to cafe 
owners in order to be consumed; nothing else was done in that case. There is also a second 
iŶƋuiƌǇ ǁhiĐh helps to liŵit liaďilitǇ, aŶd that is the ĐoŶĐept of ͚iŶteƌest͛. Although the selleƌ 
has no specific interest in the well being of the buyer, the retailer is nevertheless interested 
in its own reputation. In other words, the retailer has a business interest in the purchaser of 
the bike not being injured by an item sold in its shop.61 
Heƌe agaiŶ, ǁe see a ĐiǀiliaŶ Đouƌt deteƌŵiŶiŶg the ďƌeadth of a defeŶdaŶt͛s liaďilitǇ 
by first determining the existence of a sufficiently close relationship between the parties. 
That proximity is measured by reference to the nearness of the claimant to a contract to 
which he is not a party.62 In this regard, parallels can be drawn to the dilemmas faced by the 
common law in those areas of tort which are very near to contract but where the claimant is 
unable to sue in contract because she is not a party to it.63 The issue remains whether the 
requisite closeness between the parties exists and it is from that finding of sufficient 
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proximity that any potential for liability arises; rather than a duty owed to the world at large 
which is then constrained by causation.  
In sum, our experiment led us to the conclusion that a close analysis of a civilian 
approach to liability uncovered – from the perspective of the common law lawyer – 
examples both of the strange but also of the familiar. The stereotypical contrasts between 
inductive and deductive reasoning began to break down in our minds. At the same time, we 
came to recognize that simplistic attempts to find the analogous doctrine in the other 
system performing the same function do not necessarily give rise to a satisfactory (or 
satisfying) outcome.  
 
FROM PROXIMITY TO UNITY? 
Our foray into comparative law initially was the product of circumstance as we found that 
comparison and translation were our methods for explanation and conversation. Yet we 
also found that the attempt at greater mutual understanding of legal systems could result in 
us speaking at cross purposes and we became frustrated at the difficulty of the exercise. But 
the experience leads us now to some tentative views regarding the broader implications of 
our analysis for the definition of a mixed jurisdiction, attempts at comparative tort law, and 
the legal harmonization project within the European Union. Yet even here we have 
experienced a certain degree of mixture, diversity and ambiguity in the way in which we 
interpret a shared experience. 
 As ͚outsideƌs͛ to the ŵiǆed juƌisdiĐtioŶ ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ, ǁe haǀe fouŶd ouƌselǀes iŶ the 
privileged position of being able to observe the way in which the field is developing in 
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interesting new directions with which we find ourselves in much sympathy. The origins of 
the idea of the mixed jurisdiction – and indeed of comparative law -- seem to have been 
strongly influenced by attempts at scientific classification more generally. The mixed 
jurisdiction eŵeƌges as a kiŶd of ͚iŶ ďetǁeeŶ͛64 two pure forms that also resembles to us the 
mythological creatures produced through the crossing of species. In fact, we have always 
fouŶd ŵiǆed juƌisdiĐtioŶs to ďe soŵehoǁ stƌaŶge ďut also stƌaŶgelǇ ͚eǆotiĐ͛, ŵǇsteƌious and 
unknowable.65 Perhaps that makes it unsurprising that scholars of mixed jurisdictions in 
recent years have articulated an identity based on the idea of experimentation and the open 
ĐoŵpetitioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ideas aŶd ĐoŶĐepts fueled ďǇ ͚the continuous desire to look for 
Đoŵpaƌatiǀe iŶspiƌatioŶ͛.66 In this interpretation, the mixed jurisdiction provides the best of 
both worlds and could be a model for the social construction of a new legal system. Rather 
than being a strange creature produced through some transgression, mixed jurisdictions 
instead are laboratories for living with complexity. It is perhaps no surprise then that they 
provide, some would argue, a model to be replicated by the European Union in the process 
of legal harmonization of private law.67 
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 However, for our purposes, we find the emerging understanding of the mixed 
jurisdiction as an all inclusive, universal descriptor to be more conceptually satisfying. As 
Pƌofessoƌ Palŵeƌ has deŵoŶstƌated, the tƌaditioŶal defiŶitioŶ leaǀes the ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ 
undisturbed and unexamined.68 ‘atheƌ, the foĐus is eǆĐlusiǀelǇ upoŶ ͚the heteƌogeŶeous 
faŵilǇ of ͞the otheƌs͛͟.69 Of course, centering attention upon the exceptional and the 
unusual in itself can be a disruptive intellectual act, challenging the received wisdom that 
the norm is somehow universally true and natural. No doubt the study of mixed jurisdictions 
also has provided an important and convivial intellectual space for those who experience 
often marginalized legal identities. Increasingly, however, it appears that a reimagining of 
the disĐipliŶe is oĐĐuƌƌiŶg, ǁheƌeďǇ the Đlaiŵ is ŵade that ͚all legal sǇsteŵs aƌe ŵiǆed͛70 and 
the aŶalǇsis theŶ tuƌŶs oŶ the ͚ǀaƌious degƌees of hǇďƌiditǇ iŶ the legal ǁoƌld aƌisiŶg fƌoŵ 
different levels and layers of crossing and inteƌtǁiŶiŶg͛.71 This analysis strikes us as more in 
keeping with how culture is itself now understood in other disciplines and we can see no 
reason why legal culture is exceptional.72 Of course, the claim that everything is a hybrid 
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does not provide an answer, but it does open up a new space for the interrogation of legal 
systems.  
 In particular, the universalizing of the experience of being a mixed jurisdiction shifts 
the attention away from the exceptional and back to the dominant norms, demanding that 
we interrogate and deconstruct frequently unexamined and stereotyped assumptions about 
the supposed puƌitǇ of legal sǇsteŵs. Pƌofessoƌ Palŵeƌ͛s ƌeĐeŶt aƌtiĐle pƌoǀides aŶ 
iŵpoƌtaŶt diƌeĐtioŶ of tƌaǀel iŶ this pƌojeĐt iŶ his aŶalǇsis of the pƌoĐess of ͚douďle 
reasoŶiŶg͛ ǁithiŶ ĐiǀiliaŶ sǇsteŵs.73 We would go further, arguing that our experience 
suggests that there are double reasoning processes at work in both the civil law and 
common law systems, which further challenges the claim that it is somehow unique to the 
classically understood mixed jurisdiction. As Professor Leckey has argued in a different 
context, the task of comparison requires attention, not only to the outside, but also 
deŵaŶds that ǁe foĐus upoŶ diǀeƌsitǇ ͚iŶteƌŶal to the laǁ of a plaĐe͛ as a ŵeaŶs ͚to aǀoid aŶ 
oƌgaŶiĐ ĐoheƌeŶĐe of Đultuƌe͛.74 The focus shifts inevitably to pluralism, diversity and living 
with difference.  
 Although this shift in focus is conceptually persuasive, we are also left troubled by 
the question  of the utility or value of such comparative analysis. In this respect, we fear 
that our comparative analysis might be criticized on the same basis as other forms of 
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deconstruction in that, while the analysis may have disruptive power, it provides no recipe 
for law reform or greater convergence. But an eloquent defense of the exercise of 
comparison for its own sake has been provided by Professor Legrand. He argues that the 
ƌole of the Đoŵpaƌatiǀe laǁǇeƌ is to ͚highlight the ĐoŶtiŶgeŶt aŶd speĐifiĐ ĐhaƌaĐteƌ of ƌules, 
practices and assuŵptioŶs͛.75 The outcome, which may not be easily measurable in terms of 
͚iŵpaĐt͛, Ŷeǀeƌtheless is loftǇ if Ŷot aƌƌogaŶt: the Đoŵpaƌatiǀe laǁǇeƌ ͚liǀes ŵoƌe 
knowledgeably, since through the mediation of an other, the self can become more explicit 
to itself͛.76 We would argue that an analogy can be drawn to the rules of grammar. In 
learning another language, we often develop a much better understanding of the grammar 
of our first language.  
 While it might be satisfying to engage in the act of comparison in pursuit of 
the ͚puƌe͛ aiŵ of self-knowledge as a good, comparative law has been put to more 
utilitarian (and utopian) tasks and nowhere is this more apparent than in the context of 
legal harmonization in the European Union. Attempts to harmonize the law were originally 
uŶdeƌtakeŶ iŶ the field of ĐoŶtƌaĐt laǁ aŶd oŶlǇ ͚[ŵ]oƌe ƌeĐeŶtlǇ, toƌt laǁ has ďeeŶ added to 
the picture, and its harmonization at the European level has become a primary goal for 
ŵaŶǇ iŶstitutioŶs aŶd ƌeseaƌĐh gƌoups.͛77The role of harmonization becomes the act of 
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mixing those doctrines from different legal systems (and, indeed, jurisdictions) found to be 
the most appropriate for a transnational legal regime and therefore a new jurisdiction. This 
will not be an easy task because when private law is at stake we deal with fundamental 
issues of national identity which inevitably override arguments grounded in the language of 
͚effiĐieŶĐǇ͛. AŶ eǆaŵple ǁill ĐlaƌifǇ ouƌ poiŶt: FƌaŶĐe, iŶ the tƌaditioŶ of fraternité, in the 
field of tort law translates the pƌiŶĐiple ǁith ͚the aƌguaďlǇ ďƌoadest ƌegiŵe of stƌiĐt 
liaďilitǇ͛78 aŶd a geŶeƌous appƌoaĐh to puƌe eĐoŶoŵiĐ loss. IŶ ĐoŶtƌast EŶglaŶd ͚takes a 
much more liberal approach: free citizens are considered responsible for their own luck. 
Therefore, strict liaďilitǇ is stƌiĐtlǇ ĐoŶfiŶed … puƌe eĐoŶoŵiĐ losses ǁill ďe ĐoŵpeŶsated 
oŶlǇ uŶdeƌ speĐial, ŶaƌƌoǁlǇ ĐoŶfiŶed ĐoŶditioŶs.͛79 Even the more modest goal of 
͚ideŶtifǇiŶg ĐoŵŵoŶ sets of aƌguŵeŶts to ďe ǁeighed iŶ diffeƌeŶt ǁaǇs iŶ ǀaƌious ŶatioŶal 
juƌisdiĐtioŶs͛80 strikes us as a very ambitious project (although we may well part company 
from each other at this juncture on the merits of the political exercise). But it certainly does 
seem to both of us that the lesson to be learned from mixed jurisdictions is an appreciation 
of diversity, difference and hybridity, rather than the pursuit of an imposed unity and 
sameness. Finally, our experience of comparative tort law leaves us at least somewhat 
sǇŵpathetiĐ to Pƌofessoƌ “tapletoŶ͛s skeptiĐisŵ ƌegaƌdiŶg the pƌaĐtiĐality of exercises in 
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comparative tort law.81 Although she gƌaĐiouslǇ desĐƌiďes ͚the Ŷoďle Đause of Đoŵpaƌatiǀe 
laǁ as aŶ iŶtelleĐtual aĐtiǀitǇ͛, she is ĐƌitiĐal of ͚those ǁho foĐus oŶ its foƌeŶsiĐ utilitǇ͛.82 Like 
heƌ, ǁe ǁoƌƌǇ that Đoŵpaƌatiǀe toƌt laǁ is ͚fƌaught ǁith daŶgeƌs͛83 and in the politically 
contested context of the European Union, attempts at top down remixing are perhaps best 
avoided.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The issue of proximity in tort law -- examined from the standpoint of comparative law – has 
provided us with a vehicle to explore broader issues surrounding the internal complexity of 
legal systems, the meaning of a mixed jurisdiction and the perils of European private law 
harmonization. In retrospect, the choice of proximity is an obvious one in that it is focused 
on the central issue of responsibility towards others – where does that responsibility begin 
and where does it end? It is both a universal question but one which has no easy, 
uncontested answer. For us, the analysis of proximity opened a door into an examination of 
proximity in a different sense, namely, the proximity of legal systems to each other and the 
diversity that can be found internal to a legal system. It allowed us to interrogate the 
complexity and hybridity within our legal selves as well as the close proximity of the other. 
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In short, a greater understanding of the mixed jurisdiction has allowed us to see ourselves 
more clearly and, as European citizens, it has given us a renewed appreciation of the value 
of the diverse, the plural, and perhaps even the irreconcilable.  
